meta-ethics
I have organized my publications in meta-ethics into a few categories, to simplify finding things, and within the categories I list the most recent publications first. I provide an overall list of my publications in meta-ethics at the bottom of the page. Some of my papers are linked to PDFs, some of which are password protected. The password is "copp".
The Society-Centered Theory
Pluralist-Teleology
Realist-Expressivism and Hybrid Theories
Practical Reason and Self-Grounded Reason
Normativity and the Authority of Morality
Motivational Internalism
Moral Naturalism
Moral Twin-Earth
Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Ought Implies Can
Overall List
The Society-Centered Theory
Pluralist-Teleology
Realist-Expressivism and Hybrid Theories
Practical Reason and Self-Grounded Reason
Normativity and the Authority of Morality
Motivational Internalism
Moral Naturalism
Moral Twin-Earth
Principle of Alternate Possibilities and Ought Implies Can
Overall List
2011: “Do Animals Have Fundamental Moral Standing?” in Thomas L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds., Oxford Handbook of Animals and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 276-303.
2009: “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
2008: “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
2007: Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2007: "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
2007: "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
2007: "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
2005: “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1998: “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
1998: “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
1997: “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
1996: “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
1996: “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
1992: "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
1992: "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.
2009: “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
2008: “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
2007: Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2007: "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
2007: "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
2007: "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
2005: “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1998: “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
1998: “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
1997: “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
1996: “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
1996: “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
1995. Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
1992: "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
1992: "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.
In progress: “Indirect Epistemic Teleology Explained and Defended.”
In progress: “Needs, Values, and Normativity.”
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP)
In progress: “Needs, Values, and Normativity.”
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP)
2008: “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 167-202.
2001: “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18, pp. 1-43. Also ch. 5 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2001: “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18, pp. 1-43. Also ch. 5 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2005: “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy , 22, pp. 165-203. Also ch. 10 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2002: “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2002: “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
2001: “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
2001: “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
2001: “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53. Co-authored with David Sobel.
1993: "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.
2002: “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2002: “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
2001: “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
2001: “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
2001: “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53. Co-authored with David Sobel.
1993: "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.
2010: “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” in Samuel Black and Evan Tiffany, eds., Reasons to be Moral Revisited, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, pp. 97-130.
2010: “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin: Springer), pp. 141-165.
2010: Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
2006: Review of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1991: "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
1990: "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
1990: "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
1989: Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
1984: "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
2010: “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin: Springer), pp. 141-165.
2010: Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
2006: Review of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1991: "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
1990: "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
1990: "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
1989: Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
1984: "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
1997: “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s, The Moral Problem”, Ethics, 108, pp. 33-54.
1995: “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
1982: "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.
1995: “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
1982: "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.
2012: “Is Constructivism an Alternative to Moral Realism?” in Carla Bagnoli, ed., Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2012: “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2012: “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
2012: “Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
2011: “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism: Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
2007: "Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
2006: “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology ,” Contemporary Pragmatism , 3, pp. 39-53.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200. Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2001: “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74. Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1999: “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
1994: Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
2012: “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2012: “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
2012: “Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
2011: “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism: Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
2007: "Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
2006: “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology ,” Contemporary Pragmatism , 3, pp. 39-53.
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200. Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2001: “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74. Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1999: “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
1994: Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
2007: "Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2008: “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Analysis, 68.1, pp. 67-75.
2003: “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
1997: “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.
2003: “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
1997: “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.
2012: “Is Constructivism an Alternative to Moral Realism?” in Carla Bagnoli, ed., Constructivism in Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2012: “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2012: “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
2012: “Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
2011: “Do Animals Have Fundamental Moral Standing?” in Thomas L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds., Oxford Handbook of Animals and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 276-303.
2011: “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism: Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
2010: “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” in Samuel Black and Evan Tiffany, eds., Reasons to be Moral Revisited, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, pp. 97-130.
2010: “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin: Springer), pp. 141-165.
2010: Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
2009: “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
2008: “Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, pp. 811-819.
2008: “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 167-202.
2008: “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Analysis, 68.1, pp. 67-75.
2008: “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
2007: Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2007: "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
2007: "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
2007: "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
2007: "Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
2007: “Autonomy and the Social Construction of Values,” in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, Hommage à Wlodek - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz (electronic publication at <http://www.fil.lu.se/HommageaWlodek/site/abstra.htm>).
2006: “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology,” Contemporary Pragmatism, 3, pp. 39-53.
2006: “Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics”, in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-35.
2006: Review of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
2005: “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
2005: “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 22, pp. 165-203. Also ch. 10 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200. Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
2002: “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2002: “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
2001: “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18, pp. 1-43. Also ch. 5 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2001: “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
2001: “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
2001: “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2001: “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74. Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1999: “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
1998: “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
1998: “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
1997: “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
1997: “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.
1997: “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s, The Moral Problem”, Ethics, 108, pp. 33-54.
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1996: “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
1996: “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
1995: Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
1995: “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
1994: Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
1993: "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.
1992: "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
1992: "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.
1992: "Skepticism in Ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 1156-1159.
1992: "Meta-ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 790-798.
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1991: "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
1990: "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
1990: "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
1989: Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
1984: "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
1984: "Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth, pp 141-168.
1982: "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.
2012: “Experiments, Intuitions, and Methodology in Moral and Political Theory,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
2012: “Varieties of Moral Naturalism,” Filosofia Unisinos.
2012: “Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfit Against Normative Naturalism,” in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay, eds., Ethical Naturalism: Current Debates (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 24-57.
2011: “Do Animals Have Fundamental Moral Standing?” in Thomas L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, eds., Oxford Handbook of Animals and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 276-303.
2011: “Prinz’s Subjectivist Moral Realism: Jesse Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals,” Nous, 45, pp. 577-594.
2010: “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” in Samuel Black and Evan Tiffany, eds., Reasons to be Moral Revisited, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33, pp. 97-130.
2010: “Normativity, Deliberation, and Queerness,” in Richard Joyce and Simon Kirchin, eds., A World Without Values: Essays on John Mackie’s Error Theory (Berlin: Springer), pp. 141-165.
2010: Review of Normativity, by Judith Jarvis Thomson, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89, pp. 180-183.
2009: “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues, 19, pp. 21-37.
2009: “Is Society-Centered Moral Theory a Contemporary Version of Natural Law Theory?” Dialogue, 48, pp. 19-36.
2008: “Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77, pp. 811-819.
2008: “Realist-Expressivism and Conventional Implicature,” in Russ Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Meta-Ethics, vol. 4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 167-202.
2008: “’Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities,” Analysis, 68.1, pp. 67-75.
2008: “Darwinian Skepticism About Moral Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 18, pp. 184-204.
2007: Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
2007: "Introduction," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 1-30.
2007: "Moral Naturalism and Self-Evident Moral Truths," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 93-112.
2007: "Moral Necessities in a Contingent World," in Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 113-150.
2007: "Referring to Moral Properties: Moral Twin Earth, Again," Morality in a Natural World (CUP), pp. 230-245.
2007: “Autonomy and the Social Construction of Values,” in Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, Hommage à Wlodek - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz (electronic publication at <http://www.fil.lu.se/HommageaWlodek/site/abstra.htm>).
2006: “The Ontology of Putnam’s Ethics Without Ontology,” Contemporary Pragmatism, 3, pp. 39-53.
2006: “Introduction: Metaethics and Normative Ethics”, in David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 3-35.
2006: Review of Ethics and the A Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-ethics, by Michael Smith, in Mind, 115, pp. 476-481.
2005: “A Skeptical Challenge to Moral Non-Naturalism and a Defense of Constructivist Naturalism,” Philosophical Studies,126, pp. 269-283.
2005: “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 22, pp. 165-203. Also ch. 10 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2005: “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity”, in Peter Schaber, ed., Normativity and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag), pp. 7-45. Also ch. 8 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “Why Naturalism?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6, pp. 179-200. Also ch. 1 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2003: “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’, Blameworthiness, and Alternate Possibilities”, in David Widerker and Michael McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate Press), pp. 265-299.
2002: “Desires, Motives, and Reasons: Scanlon’s Rationalistic Moral Psychology”, Social Theory and Practice, 28, pp. 243-276. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2002: “Gert on Reasons, Rationality, Harms, and Lists”, in Walter Sinnott_Armstrong and Robert Audi, eds. Rationality, Rules, And Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 91-110.
2001: “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 18, pp. 1-43. Also ch. 5 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2001: “Against Internalism About Reasons – Gert’s Rational Options”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, pp. 455-461.
2001: “Rationality, Autonomy, and Basic Needs”, in Neil Roughley, ed., Being Humans, (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 334-355.
2001: “Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire”, Analysis, 61, pp. 44-53. Co-authored with David Sobel.
2001: “Four Epistemological Challenges to Ethical Naturalism: Naturalized Epistemology and the First-Person Perspective”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 26, pp. 31-74. Also ch. 2 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
2000: “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth,” Synthèse, 124, pp. 113-137. Also ch. 6 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1999: “Korsgaard on Normativity, Identity, and the Grounds of Obligation”, in Julian Nida-Rumelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Berlin: de Gruyter), pp. 572-581.
1998: “Morality and Society - The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist,” Analyse und Kritik, 20, pp. 30-45.
1998: “Reasons and Societies: Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, pp. 96-102.
1997: “Does Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society?” Analyse und Kritik, 19, pp. 189-212.
1997: “Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility”, Nous, 31, pp. 441-456.
1997: “Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s, The Moral Problem”, Ethics, 108, pp. 33-54.
1997: “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 14, pp. 86-106. Also ch. 9 in Morality in a Natural World (CUP).
1996: “Moral Knowledge in Society-Centered Moral Theory”, in Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds., Moral Knowledge? (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 243-266.
1996: “Moral Skepticism,” in Donald M. Borchert, ed., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Supplement, (New York: Macmillan), pp. 364-365.
1995: Morality, Normativity, and Society (New York: Oxford University Press; paperback edition 2001).
1995: “Moral Obligation and Moral Motivation”, in Kai Nielsen and Jocyelyne Couture, eds., On the Relevance of Metaethics: New Essays on Metaethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 21, pp. 187-219.
1994: Review of Moral Reasons by Jonathan Dancy, in Philosophical Books, 35, pp. 197-199.
1993: "Reason and Needs", in R.G. Frey and Christopher Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, and Morality (Cambridge University Press), pp. 112-137.
1992: "The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III", Philosophical Perspectives, 6, 261-284.
1992: "The Concept of Society", Dialogue, 31, pp. 184-212.
1992: "Skepticism in Ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 1156-1159.
1992: "Meta-ethics", Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, Garland Publishing Company), pp. 790-798.
1991: "Moral Realism: Facts and Norms", Ethics, 101, pp. 610-624.
1991: "Moral Skepticism", Philosophical Studies, 62, pp. 203-233.
1990: "Normativity and the Very Idea of Moral Epistemology", Southern Journal of Philosophy, 29, Supplement - 1990 Spindel Conference, pp. 189-210.
1990: "Contractarianism and Moral Skepticism", in Peter Vallentyne, ed., Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on Gauthier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 196-228.
1990: "Explanation and Justification in Ethics", Ethics, 100, pp 237-258.
1989: Review of Morals by Agreement by David Gauthier, in The Philosophical Review , 98, pp 411-414.
1984: "Introduction", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth: New Essays on the Foundations of Ethics (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld), pp 1-24.
1984: "Considered Judgments and Moral Justification: Conservatism in Moral Theory", in David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds., Morality, Reason and Truth, pp 141-168.
1982: "Harman on Internalism, Relativism and Logical Form", Ethics, 92, pp 227-242.