In his important new book, Russ Shafer-Landau takes the defense of moral non-naturalism to a new level of sophistication. The key doctrines he aims to defend are that moral properties are sui generis and non-natural, and that moral predicates are not analyzable in naturalistic terms (p. 66). In the course of defending these doctrines, he deals with an impressive range of complex issues, yet his fundamental strategy is simple. He distinguishes among moral realism, constructivism, and non-cognitivism, and, among realist theories, between naturalism and non-naturalism. He then argues that constructivism, non-cognitivism and naturalism face grave difficulties and that the standard objections to non-naturalism miss the mark. Non-naturalism emerges as the most plausible view.

I have two goals. First is to show that Shafer-Landau’s objections to so-called “constructivism” are unsuccessful. After explaining constructivism, as he understands it, I discuss two examples, a classic divine command theory and my own “society-centered” theory. The most interesting of Shafer-Landau’s objections is a generalization of the Euthyphro dilemma (pp. 42–43). I argue that society-centered theory is an example of a kind of “happy” constructivist theory that is not susceptible to the objection.

My second goal is to argue that Shafer-Landau’s theory lacks the resources to address in a substantive way certain skeptical worries about morality, worries that “happy”
constructivist theories can answer. This, I believe, is a major reason to be dissatisfied with Shafer-Landau’s non-naturalism. The problem is not that his theory is realist rather than constructivist. For, as I explain, certain “happy” constructivist theories have “twins” that are realist and yet answer the skeptical worries. The problem is that Shafer-Landau’s theory is a kind of bald realism that lacks internal structure of the kind needed to address the skeptical worries in a substantive way. If we take these worries seriously, we must see Shafer-Landau’s theory as inadequate.

1. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND REALISM

The term “constructivism” is widely used in the literature. To avoid terminological issues, I shall simply let Shafer-Landau have the word.

The motivation for constructivism, as I understand it, is to respond in a substantive way to the skeptical worries about morality that I mentioned above. One example is a worry about what could make it the case that certain garden-variety facts are normative or have normative significance. Constructivist theories attempt to respond to these worries by explaining the nature of morality in terms of putatively less worrisome phenomena, such as informed choice, rational choice, or the like. The important point is that the skeptical worries that motivate constructivism tend to be neglected by theories of other kinds. Of course, it will not be clear what is at stake until I have explained the worries more fully and shown how society-centered theory deals with them.

Shafer-Landau views constructivism as a kind of cognitivist irrealism. It denies a thesis he takes to be central to realism, the thesis that some moral truths are “stance-independent” (p. 15). He says, “Realists believe that there are moral truths that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense that the moral standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from within any given actual or hypothetical perspective” (p. 15). In a footnote, he explains that “moral principles” or “standards” are
conditionals that can be either true or false. The correct standards, “in conjunction with relevant non-moral facts”, explain “why the moral facts are as they are” (p. 15, fn. 2). For example, if slavery is wrong, then there is a true standard that, together with the non-moral facts, implies a prohibition on slavery.

Constructivism denies the stance-independence thesis. Shafer-Landau says (p. 14), Constructivists endorse the reality of a domain, but explain this by invoking a constructive function out of which the reality is created. This function has moral reality as its output. What distinguishes constructivist theories from one another are the different views about the proper input. ... What is common to all constructivists is the idea that moral reality is constituted by the attitudes, actions, responses, or outlooks of persons, possibly under idealized circumstances.

Shafer-Landau explains further that, according to constructivism, moral standards are “made true” by being endorsed from a preferred standpoint (p. 16). Perhaps we can say, then, that a constructivist theory defines an “endorsement function” that takes a specified kind of input and yields moral standards as output, where the theory holds that these and only these standards are true, and that they are true because they are the output of the function.

Although Shafer-Landau views constructivism as irrealist, he says it “endorses” the “reality” of the moral “domain”. To explain this, let me distinguish between “basic realism” and “stance-independent realism”, which is a kind of basic realism. I stipulate that basic realism accepts the following doctrines: First, there are moral properties, such as rightness. Second, these properties are sometimes instantiated. Third, moral predicates express these properties. Fourth, moral assertions express beliefs regarding the instantiation of these properties. Fifth, in that they are properties, rightness and other moral properties have the same metaphysical status as familiar non-moral properties, whatever that status is. Basic realism accepts all five doctrines. Stance-independent realism adds the sixth thesis that facts about the instantiation of moral properties are “stance-independent”.

4 Basic realism accepts all five doctrines. Stance-independent realism adds the sixth thesis that facts about the instantiation of moral properties are “stance-independent”.
Theories that Shafer-Landau counts as “realist” appear to accept all six doctrines of stance-independent realism. Constructivist theories reject stance-independence, but some of them, including society-centered theory, accept the five doctrines of basic realism. This is an important sense in which they “endorse” the “reality” of the “moral domain.” Divine command theory is a useful example.

2. DIVINE COMMAND THEORY AND THE EUHYPHRO OBJECTION

According to Philip Quinn, a kind of action is morally obligatory just in case God has commanded that actions of that kind be performed, and, he holds, God’s commanding that an action be performed is what makes it obligatory. He holds that an action’s having the property of being obligatory depends on God’s commands. So far, this is a classic divine command theory.

Divine command theories reject stance-independence, for, as Shafer-Landau says, they propose “a constructive function that explains the correctness of the proper moral standards” (p. 16, fn. 4). According to such theories, we can say, a moral standard is true just in case God has commanded compliance with it, and God’s commanding compliance with it is what makes it true. Shafer-Landau concedes that divine command theories seem to be realist (p. 16, fn. 4). I think this is because they are a kind of basic realism.

The strongest objection to divine command theories, says Quinn, can be adapted from a discussion in Plato’s *Euthyphro.* The objection takes the form of a dilemma. Suppose that God commands compliance with a given moral standard. Either He commands compliance because compliance is obligatory, or compliance is obligatory because He commands it. The first alternative is incompatible with the theory as we have formulated it, since the theory holds that what makes compliance obligatory is God’s command. But the second alternative seems unacceptable, for it seems to
allow the possibility of God’s commanding compliance with
an arbitrary or horrible standard.

Quinn replies that God’s goodness ensures that His com-
mands are not arbitrary. And Quinn explains that, in his
view, something is good just in case it resembles God in a
relevant way. The result is not a form of pure constructivism.
It is a divine command theory of duty-related properties com-
bined with a resemblance theory of goodness. The latter im-
plies, in Shafer-Landau’s words, that “there are moral truths
that obtain independently of any preferred perspective”
(p. 15). Hence, Quinn’s overall view is a kind of stance-inde-
pendent realism.

Shafer-Landau holds that any (pure) constructivist theory
is vulnerable to a version of the Euthyphro objection (pp. 42–
43). Any such theory specifies a preferred standpoint. Either
this standpoint is moralized, in that the endorsement of stan-
dards in that standpoint is subject to moral constraints, or it
is not. If it is not moralized, then, Shafer-Landau says, “there
is no reason to expect that the principles that emerge ... will
capture our deepest ethical convictions, or respect the various
platitudes that fix our understanding of ethical concepts”
(p. 42, footnote suppressed). But if the standpoint is moral-
ized, then there are moral constraints that “are not them-
selves the product of construction” (p. 42). This is stance-
independent realism, not constructivism.

Shafer-Landau does suggest a strategy for rescuing con-
structivism. He says that to avoid resting moral truth on
arbitrary endorsements, and to avoid “lapsing into [stance-
independent] realism”, a constructivist theory should say that
the relevant endorsements must have “been formed through
exceptional attentiveness to non-moral reasons” (p. 43).

The strategy Shafer-Landau is suggesting is familiar. It is
adopted by a family of constructivist theories that attempt to
“reduce” morality to practical rationality in a restricted
standpoint. This family includes Kantian theory and neo-
Hobbesian contractarianism as well as society-centered the-
ory. In recognizing that theories in this family can escape
between the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma, Shafer-Landau
is acknowledging implicitly that the *Euthyphro* objection does not apply to all constructivist theories. Shafer-Landau objects that it is hard to see why choices that are responsive to non-moral reasons should determine the moral truth (p. 43). But this amounts merely to the reasonable demand that theories of this kind be supported by arguments.

There is, however, a serious concern about these theories. Their aim is to “reduce” morality to practical rationality, but it is arguable that the skeptical worries that motivate constructivism merely re-appear in such theories as worries about practical rationality. Theories of this kind invite a skepticism about the normativity of judgments of practical rationality. The problem of explaining normativity might simply have been moved to a new location.

### 3. SOCIETY-CENTERED THEORY

The idea behind society-centered theory is simple. We live in societies, and we need to live in societies. We order our lives partly on the basis of norms we share, where our sharing them facilitates beneficial cooperation and coordination among us. To the extent that the currency of these norms actually functions as well as can be, to make things go well in society, the norms are justified, and corresponding moral judgments are true. A morality is a system of norms that is justified to the extent that its currency in society enables society to get along, and to meet its basic needs. This is the central idea. The underlying intuition can be expressed as a thought about the function of morality, *viz.*, that morality has the function of making society possible by laying down rules governing our lives that, when they have currency in society, enable society to get along. Different moral codes would differ in how well they would serve this function, and a society would be rational to choose a code to serve in it as the social moral code that would serve this function better than any alternative. The truth about what morality requires depends on what is required by the moral code, the currency of which in society would best serve this function.
There are two key parts to the view. First is the standard-based theory of normative propositions and second is the society-centered theory of morality.\(^8\)

The standard-based theory explicates the truth conditions of moral propositions in terms of the status of relevantly corresponding moral “standards” or “norms”. To avoid confusing my usage of the term “standard” with Shafer-Landau’s different usage, I shall use the term “norm” and speak of the “norm-based theory”. This theory rests on a distinction between moral propositions – such as the proposition that torture is wrong – and moral norms – such as the norm prohibiting torture that would be expressed by the imperative, “Do not torture anyone!” Moral propositions are potential objects of belief. But as I use the term, norms are not objects of belief. Most of us subscribe to the norm that prohibits torture in that, among other things, we are inhibited from torturing and would feel guilty to torture anyone, but it makes no sense to suppose that someone believes a norm. Norms are expressed by imperatives, and imperatives are not believed, nor do they represent the world as being one way or another. They lack truth value.

The norm-based theory proposes a schema for giving the truth conditions of moral propositions in terms of the relevant status of corresponding norms. Applied to the proposition that torture is wrong, the theory says the proposition is true just in case the corresponding norm, the aforementioned rule that prohibits torture, has a relevantly authoritative status.\(^9\) In my book, I spoke of this status as that of being justified, but this detail is unimportant.\(^{10}\) The key idea is that there is some status such that when a norm enjoys that status, the fact that it does underwrites the truth of corresponding moral propositions. Call this the “truth-grounding status.”

The schema proposed by the norm-based theory is intended to be applicable to laying out the truth conditions for any kind of normative proposition in terms of a relevant truth-grounding status of corresponding norms. The schema says that a (pure) normative proposition of type K is true if and only if a corresponding norm of type K has the K-relevant
truth-grounding status. As applied to propositions of etiquette, for instance, it says that a (pure) proposition of etiquette, such as the proposition that it is impolite to wear hats indoors, is true if and only if a corresponding norm of etiquette has the etiquette-relevant status. There is room for debate about what this status might be, of course.

Society-centered theory provides a theory about the status that a moral norm must have in order that corresponding moral propositions be true. It links the truth conditions of moral propositions to the status that corresponding norms have when the society would be rational to choose them to serve in the society as the societal moral code. I understand the rationality of a society’s choice to depend on whether the choice would best serve the society’s needs. Hence, the society-centered theory links the truth conditions of moral propositions to the status that corresponding norms have when their serving in a society as the societal moral code would enable the society better to serve its needs than would the currency of alternative sets of rules.

The issue of how best to promote societal needs clearly is empirical. Hence, the moral implications of society-centered theory are both contingent and somewhat speculative. I think the upshot is likely to be that a deontological moral code of a familiar kind qualifies as having the “truth-grounding status”. Such a code would impose familiar duties on us.

On my approach, moral “properties” are best viewed as relations. Strictly speaking, wrongness, for example, is a relation between actions and a relevant society. To be sure, since I believe that societies have basically the same needs, I think the moral codes that are justified relative to different societies will tend to be similar in content. Yet societies can be in different circumstances, which means that the moral codes justified in relation to them are unlikely to be exactly the same. This point gives rise to worries of various kinds, but I have to set them aside.

This is the view in a nutshell, although this brief exposition raises many questions that I am unable to answer here. I cannot to pause explain the idea of a society, nor can I defend
the idea that societies are capable in principle of rational choice.\textsuperscript{16} It is important that society-centered theory qualifies as a form of basic realism,\textsuperscript{17} but it rejects stance-independence.

4. SOCIETY-CENTERED THEORY AND THE \textit{EUTHYPHRO} OBJECTION

The question to ask at this point is whether society-centered theory has the resources to answer the \textit{Euthyphro} objection. According to society-centered theory, a system of moral norms that would be rationally chosen by the society to serve as the societal moral code is deemed to have the truth-grounding status. Either the standpoint of society is moralized, says Shafer-Landau, or it is not. I deny that the standpoint is moralized. But then, says Shafer-Landau, “there is no reason to expect that the principles that emerge from such a construction process will capture our deepest ethical convictions, or respect the various platitudes that fix our understanding of ethical concepts” (p. 42, footnote suppressed). It is true that in society-centered theory, the norms with the relevant truth-grounding status are ones that society would be rational to choose. But Shafer-Landau objects, it needs to be explained why choices that are responsive to \textit{non-moral reasons} should be definitive of \textit{moral truth} (p. 43).

I have attempted to explain this by motivating both the norm-based theory and the society-centered account of morality. In doing so, I have invoked certain theoretical ideas as well as ideas that I view as platitudes. It is a platitude, I think, that the \textit{point} of morality is to make it possible for societies to get along together, to cope with common difficulties, and to work together cooperatively. I have also invoked empirical claims that seem plausible, such as the claim that societies \textit{need} a shared moral code to get along together. It is natural as well to think that the currency of some moral codes would do better than the currency of some others at enabling societies to get along. A society surely would be rational to choose a moral code that would do better than
the alternatives. It is a short step from these ideas to the soci-
ety-centered theory.

Shafer-Landau doubts that constructivism can “capture
our deepest ethical convictions”, and this is a serious chal-
lenge to society-centered theory. Obviously, however, I can-
not attempt to address this worry here. I have attempted to
answer worries of this kind in other work.18

Shafer-Landau points out that a constructivist theory needs
to be able to rebut “a host of criticisms peculiar to its own
formulation” (p. 43). Of course this is true of any theory.
One worry is especially serious, however. It is the objection I
mentioned before that since society-centered theory and simi-
lar theories invoke norms of practical rationality, they owe us
an account of the normativity of judgments of practical ratio-
nality. Have we simply moved the problem of normativity
back one step?

Society-centered theory is “reductionist”; it “reduces” the
normativity of morality to the normativity of rational
choice.19 It postpones the difficult question of whether it is
possible to explain normativity in a fundamental way, or
whether, instead, normativity must be left as an unexplained
primitive. To be sure, a reductionist theory must eventually
face the challenge of defending the theory of rational choice
that it presupposes. This can be done, however. Elsewhere I
have proposed a theory that accounts for the truth conditions
of judgments of self-grounded rationality by combining the
norm-based account with a theory of the truth-grounding sta-
tus of norms of rational choice.20 It is important to note,
however, that there is no need to rest society-centered theory
on a theory of rational choice.

The central ideas of the theory are that any society needs
to have a societal moral code in order to enable its people to
get along together, and that some possible societal moral
codes are such that their currency would do better at en-
abling this. Given these ideas, I claim roughly that a society
would be rational to choose a societal moral code. But the
central ideas could be captured without making any such
claim. In recent work where I have applied the theory, I have
emphasized the point about the societal need for a societal moral code. I have been implicitly using a version of society-centered theory that does not rely on claims about rational societal choice. 21 This version of the theory explains the truth conditions of moral propositions in terms of the status that moral norms have when their currency in a society would enable the society better to meet its needs than would the currency of alternative sets of rules. Call this the “basic” society-centered view. The basic society-centered theory has the theoretical advantage that it does not presuppose a theory of practical rationality. 22

Although the original society-centered theory is constructivist, the basic theory is not. According to the basic theory, the truth of a moral proposition depends on which system of norms is such that its currency would best serve the needs of the relevant society, but this is a stance-independent matter. Hence, the basic theory is an example of stance-independent realism. But since the original theory and the basic theory are merely different formulations of the same underlying view, and since they are (nearly) extensionally equivalent, 23 the difference between constructivism and stance-independent moral realism is rather shallow.

I now turn to the skeptical worries about morality that I mentioned before. Unlike society-centered theory, Shafer-Landau’s theory is unable to provide substantive answers to these worries. The problem is not that his theory is a kind of stance-independent realism. The basic society-centered theory is a form of stance-independent realism and it deals with the skeptical worries. The problem is that Shafer-Landau’s theory is a kind of bald moral realism that lacks sufficient internal structure to address the worries.

5. SKEPTICISM ABOUT MORALITY

Imagine someone who aims simply to live his life in accord with his own ends. He recognizes no constraints on his pursuit of his ends. In some moods he concedes that he has reasons to live in accord with his ends, but he is not fully convinced that
there are any reasons at all. He denies that there are any standards, other than those set by his own ends, that he has any intrinsic reason to pay attention to. His ends might include some that we would characterize as moral values as well as some we would characterize as epistemic. Nevertheless, he thinks it is nonsense to suppose that there are moral constraints on his behavior. He cannot see what in the world could make it the case that there are obligations or reasons that constrain his pursuit of what he values. He cannot see what in the world could make any facts be normative or have normative significance. Of course, he cannot avoid making decisions, but he makes decisions in light of his own ends.

This person accepts a kind of moral skepticism that is, I think, more resilient than any argument that could be given for it. In this respect, his skepticism is similar to skepticism about the existence of God. It has a life of its own, not dependent on arguments. I think that an adequate meta-ethical theory must take these skeptical concerns seriously. 24

The society-centered theory provides a distinctive kind of answer to the concerns. It explains what would make it the case that we have moral duties and reasons, and it explains what would give certain facts moral significance. It is embedded in a general theory of normative judgment, the norm-based theory, which can be used to explain what gives rise to other kinds of reasons, such as epistemic reasons and self-grounded practical reasons.

Of course a skeptic might be dissatisfied with the answers provided by society-centered theory. Some might think, for example, that the theory does not provide an adequate account of the stringent normativity of moral judgment. 25 But society-centered theory does at least address the skeptical concerns and provide answers to them.

Shafer-Landau discusses three questions that are closely related to the skeptical worries. They are, “What makes moral judgments true?” (p. 45), “Why is it that the correct moral standards are correct?” (p. 46), and “How is it that moral obligations are intrinsically reason-giving?” (p. 49). He concedes that his position provides no substantive answers to these
questions that would be of interest to skeptics (or “anti-realists”) (p. 48). At bottom, Shafer-Landau thinks there is nothing that makes the true moral standards be true or that makes moral obligations entail reasons. These things “simply are true”, just as the laws of physics simply are true, “and there won’t be any illuminating explanation of what makes them true” (p. 47, also p. 46). This is “a brute fact about the way the world works” (p. 48). I find this difficult to believe. Shafer-Landau admits that his responses don’t inspire him “with any sense of satisfaction” and that they are not likely to “go any way toward assuaging the worries of moral antirealists” (p. 48). But he says the point is simply that if “some standard is true, irreducible, and to be construed realistically, then nothing makes it true” (p. 48). This is to concede the inability of his theory to deal substantively with the skeptical worries.

Shafer-Landau concedes that constructivism “has a decided explanatory advantage over moral realism” (p. 46, sic). He suggests, however, that “if realism’s explanatory deficit is as serious as constructivists allege, then we ought to be antirealists about everything”. He says this because he thinks realism about any subject matter gives rise to skeptical worries analogous to those that afflict his theory and faces similar difficulty in answering the worries (p. 48). But the skeptical concerns at issue here are focused specifically on morality and arise chiefly because of the normativity of moral judgment. They do not arise with respect to every subject matter. Moreover, the difficulty faced by Shafer-Landau’s theory is not due to the fact that it is realist. Society-centered theory is a form of basic realism and the basic society-centered theory is a naturalistic form of stance-independent moral realism. Some realist theories do address the skeptical concerns.

I conclude that Shafer-Landau’s theory is unable to address the skeptical concerns in a substantive way. Is this a serious problem? Shafer-Landau seems to concede that it is. He acknowledges that constructivism has “a distinctive explanatory advantage and ought to be preferred”, other things being equal (p. 51). But he doubts that other things are equal. For, he says, the Euthyphro problem “besets all
forms of constructivism”, and any constructivist theory must be vindicated “against all criticisms specific to its particular formulation” (p. 51). I have argued, however, that the *Euthyphro* problem does not beset all constructivist theories. Moreover, some forms of stance-independent realism address the skeptical concerns. Of course any theory must attempt to answer criticisms. The fundamental criticism of Shafer-Landau’s moral realism is that it does not have the resources to deal with the skeptical worries. If we take these worries seriously, then we cannot be satisfied with a theory that fails to address them in a substantive way.

490

NOTES

491 * I am grateful to Jon Tresan for helpful comments.


494 3 Regarding irrealism, see pp. 15 and 17–18. Regarding cognitivism, see p. 39.


496 5 Philip Quinn, “Theological Voluntarism”, forthcoming in David Copp (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*. In the following I draw on my “Introduction: Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics”.

497 6 Quinn, “Theological Voluntarism”.


499 8 I developed both in Copp (1995).

500 9 The example illustrates the relevant kind of correspondence. It is difficult to generalize because of the variety of moral concepts. I discuss this issue in Copp (1995).

501 10 I am ignoring my distinction between “type-one” and “type-two” normative propositions (Copp, 1995, pp. 22–24).

502 11 A “pure” normative proposition of type K has no non-K-normative entailments or presuppositions (other than those given by the norm-based
theory itself). The proposition that Smith was wrong to steal Jones’s car
is impure.
12 See David Copp, ‘The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason’, Social
Philosophy and Policy, 22 (2005). The account of politeness that I propose
treats propositions of etiquette as type-two normative.
13 Strictly speaking, it depends on whether the choice would best serve
the society’s needs and enable it to serve its values. I ignore the complica-
tion about values since only a society’s non-moral values would be relev-
ant and societies lack any interesting non-moral values. See Copp, 1995,
pp. 190–198 and pp. 206–207. I develop my account of rational choice,
and explain the idea of a basic need, in Copp, 1995, chapter 9. I discuss
the basic needs of societies at pp. 192–194.
15 See Copp (1995, chapters 7 and 8).
16 For detail, see Copp (1995, pp. 218–223). See also David Copp, ‘Does
Moral Theory Need the Concept of Society’, Analyse et Kritik 19 (1997),
pp. 189–212.
The True and the Nasty: Reply to Leist’, Analyse et Kritik 20 (1998),
pp. 30–45.
21 See, for example, David Copp, ‘The Idea of a Legitimate State’, Philos-
22 This was pointed out by Richmond Campbell, ‘Critical Notice of
David Copp, Morality, Normativity, and Society’, Canadian Journal of
23 Jon Tresan pointed out that there may be exotic cases that distinguish
them extensionally.
24 I argued this in David Copp, ‘Moral Skepticism’, Philosophical Studies
25 For discussion of related issues, see David Copp, ‘Moral Naturalism
and Three Grades of Normativity’, in Peter Schaber (ed.), Normativity
and Naturalism (Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, 2004), pp. 7–45.